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Abstract: Heterogeneity in bank responses to monetary policy is consistent with an aggregate
lending channel. However, estimates of bank responses are typically obtained using realized
federal funds rate changes, which are endogenous to expected, macroeconomic fundamentals.
As such, estimated heterogeneity can arise from expected fundamentals. Using an exogenous
policy measure identiﬁed from narratives on FOMC intentions and real-time forecasts, we ﬁnd
greater heterogeneity in responses. There is a much stronger monetary policy transmission to
smaller banks. The shielding of lending amongst holding companies is larger using the exogenous
measure. Unlike previous research, we ﬁnd that holdings of securities amplify exogenous policy
transmission, while equity capital negates it. The results highlight the importance of controlling
for policy endogeneity in future studies of bank lending behavior.
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The role of the banking sector in the transmission of monetary policy has been studied in
great detail in both the theoretical and applied literature. According to the theory of the
lending channel, contractionary open market operations reduce banking sector reserves and
deposits, forcing a reduction in lending volumes because banks are constrained in their ability
to substitute lost deposits with alternative sources of ﬁnance. In practice, this mechanism may
be reinforced by a broader credit channel, whereby tight policy reduces borrower collateral and
induces banks to raise the premium on loans relative to the competitive cost of funds (the
external ﬁnance premium). Propagation of monetary policy via these loan supply channels is
diﬀerent from textbook treatments of monetary transmission which emphasize the sensitivity
of aggregate expenditure to interest rate movements.1
Following the work of Kashyap and Stein (2000), a number of empirical studies have explored
the heterogeneity in bank lending responses to monetary policy. To the extent that ﬁnancing
constraints vary with banks’ access to liquidity and collateral, the existence of a lending channel
implies that loan responses to policy are a function of observable bank characteristics related to
such access. Kashyap and Stein show that banks with relatively large and liquid asset bases are
better able to shield their lending growth during periods of tight monetary policy. The same
phenomenon has been documented for banks with relatively high equity capital-to-assets ratios
(Kishan and Opiela, 2000), banks whose loan books are readily securitized (Loutskina, 2005),
banks aﬃliated to a holding company (Ashcraft, 2006), and banks that can raise funds from
international operations (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2008).
A fundamental issue addressed in each of these papers is whether heterogeneity linked to
a speciﬁc characteristic can be interpreted as a loan supply eﬀect (as in the narrow and broad
lending channels), rather than an amalgam of possible loan supply and loan demand eﬀects.
A large amount of evidence for homogeneous loan demand conditional upon one or more bank
characteristics has been provided.2 With homogenous loan demands, any heterogeneity in
lending responses across the conditioning bank characteristics is consistent with the existence
of a bank lending channel aﬀecting loan supply.
By contrast, much less attention has been devoted to the question of what measure of
1See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for a review of the diﬀerent elements of the transmission mechanism.
2See Ashcraft (2006) for a discussion of this evidence.
1monetary policy is appropriate for the assessment of bank lending behavior. Most papers use
the change in the eﬀective (realized) federal funds rate to capture monetary policy, reﬂecting
the fact that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has targeted the federal funds rate
for much of the last 30 years.3 While federal funds rate changes initiated by the FOMC are
surely exogenous to the circumstances facing any single bank, the factors to which policymakers
respond (e.g., expected output growth and inﬂation) are potential determinants of individual
bank lending, through both loan demand and loan supply eﬀects. This raises the possibility
that lending responses to federal funds rate changes confound the eﬀects of monetary policy
and other lending market drivers. Furthermore, if the strength of any eﬀects from confounding
variables is related to bank characteristics, the heterogeneity in lending responses to monetary
policy will not be correctly estimated.
Motivated by these possibilities, we evaluate the heterogeneity in bank lending responses
to federal funds rate changes that are plausibly exogenous to expected output growth and
inﬂation. The identiﬁcation of this policy component builds upon work by Romer and Romer
(2004), who combined narrative evidence on Federal Reserve intentions and the Greenbook
forecasts produced by Federal Reserve staﬀ in order to control for endogenous policy changes.
Bank lending responses to the identiﬁed policy measure are compared with lending responses
estimated from realized federal funds rate changes that have been the focus of most previous
research.
Our results indicate ﬁve important diﬀerences in bank lending responses to exogenous and
endogenous components of monetary policy. First, one year after an exogenous monetary con-
traction, the reduction in lending growth at the average bank which is not part of a holding
company is up to twice that from a rise in the realized federal funds rate. Second, the amount by
which a bank can shield its lending growth from a monetary policy contraction, either through
accessing a large asset base or drawing on funds from aﬃliates in a holding company, is 1.5 times
larger when estimated purely in response to identiﬁed, exogenous monetary policy. Third, the
share of bank assets held as securities mitigates the lending response to a realized federal funds
rate increase, but ampliﬁes the lending contraction to an exogenous federal funds rate increase.
In contrast, the ratio of equity capital-to-assets shields lending growth from an exogenous mon-
3Alternative monetary policy measures which have been used in the literature on bank lending include those
due to Boschen and Mills (1991, 1995), Strongin (1995), and Bernanke and Mihov (1998). See section 2 for
further discussion.
2etary tightening, but is only weakly correlated with lending responses to realized federal funds
rate increases.
We oﬀer explanations for these ﬁndings in terms of the endogeneity of monetary policy. They
provide a new perspective on the measurement of balance sheet liquidity and the consequences
of shifts in balance sheet composition for the strength of monetary policy propagation. Our
fourth ﬁnding qualiﬁes the results on balance sheet composition. Following the introduction
of the source of strength doctrine for bank holding companies in 1987, the eﬀects of asset
composition on lending responses to monetary policy occur only among banks that are not part
of a holding company. Aﬃliated banks appear to be able to smooth lending in the face of
monetary policy shocks using the internal capital markets of the holding company, such that
balance sheet composition does not aﬀect lending responses to monetary policy. Fifth and
lastly, banks that do a larger proportion of business in the residential sector contract lending by
a smaller amount following an exogenous policy tightening. This is consistent with better access
to the ﬁnance needed to sustain such loans, as might arise with securitization (Loutskina, 2005).
In contrast, following changes in the realized federal funds rate, this eﬀect is much smaller and
only marginally signiﬁcant.
To place our paper in context, it is important to consider how potential biases from con-
founding monetary policy with other loan demand and loan supply determinants have been
handled in previous research. Each of the papers discussed earlier directly controls for output
growth, inﬂation, or both, in their empirical models of lending growth. To the extent that
such variables eﬀectively capture the sources of endogenous monetary policy, their inclusion in
a lending growth regression accounts for extraneous loan demand and loan supply shifters, such
that the structural eﬀects of policy can be identiﬁed. Under the assumption that loan demand
does not vary with the characteristic, heterogeneity in these structural eﬀects is then measured
via interactions with bank characteristics.
The starting point for our paper is that current output growth and inﬂation are not the only
sources of endogenous policy – a forward-looking policymaker who desires to minimize cyclical
ﬂuctuations will also respond to forecasts for its objective variables. If these forecasts correlate
with private sector expectations for growth and inﬂation, loan demand and loan supply may
ﬂuctuate in a manner that is systematically related to observable bank characteristics. Our
3results highlight instances in which this appears to be the case. In light of these ﬁndings, we
argue that future studies of bank lending behavior should take into account the forward-looking
component of endogenous monetary policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we explain how endogenous
monetary policy movements may induce biased estimates of lending responses to monetary
policy. Motivated by these possibilities, in section 3 we outline an identiﬁcation strategy for
exogenous monetary policy. We then discuss the bank-level econometric framework and data
that we use to compare lending responses to identiﬁed policy changes with lending responses
to realized changes in the federal funds rate. In section 4, we present our core results. We
continue in section 5 with a consideration of their robustness to changes in estimation and data
deﬁnitions. Finally, we conclude in section 6 with a summary and a discussion of the importance
of monetary policy identiﬁcation for future research concerning bank lending behavior.
2 Bank lending and monetary policy
How might endogenous monetary policy contaminate estimates of the lending channel? Here, we
outline the potential biases aﬀecting the estimates in the literature that rely upon the eﬀective
federal funds rate to measure monetary policy. In each of the cases discussed, the underlying
idea is that expectations over output growth and inﬂation determine both policy and bank
lending choices. These eﬀects are not captured in the standard lending growth regression.
Consequently, there is an omitted variable problem that aﬀects the estimated response of bank
lending to federal funds rate changes. Moreover, our discussion covers lending responses that
are conditional upon bank characteristics, which have received considerable attention in recent
research. We argue that estimates of these cross eﬀects are also aﬀected by the endogeneity of
monetary policy. In light of the possible eﬀects described, we compare bank lending responses
to exogenous monetary policy changes (described in section 3.1) and to the realized monetary
policy changes that have been used in previous research.
Studies of bank lending responses to monetary policy typically estimate regressions of the
form:
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4where i indexes banks, t indexes time, ∆L denotes the change (t minus t − 1) in the natural
logarithm of total loans measured at current prices, M is a monetary policy measure, X is a
vector of J bank-speciﬁc characteristics, Z is a vector of K control variables, and ε is a mean-
zero error term. All other Greek letters denote parameters. In practice, bank lending regressions
are much richer than equation 1, typically including autoregressive terms and dynamics in M
and X. In section 3, we describe a more complex version of model 1 that incorporates these
features. It also will provide the basis for our empirical work. However, the present speciﬁcation
is suﬃcient to illustrate the arguments that we develop in this section.4
As noted in the introduction, the vector X comprises bank characteristics that capture
access to ﬁnance. These might include total bank assets, bank holding company aﬃliation, an
indicator for whether a bank operates internationally, measures of balance sheet composition
such as equity capital-to-assets and securities-to-assets ratios, and information concerning the
characteristics of the bank loan book (e.g., the ease with which it can be securitized). In the
aftermath of contractionary monetary policy, banks that can access funds from these sources
may shield lending growth from the eﬀects of an erosion of reserves and deposits.
What interpretation can be given to the cross eﬀects (interactions) between monetary policy
and bank characteristics? It is commonly argued that while factors such as bank size and the
bank equity ratio may capture access to funds that matters for loan supply, they also reﬂect
features of loan demand. For example, large banks may cherry pick customers whose loan
demand is relatively stable, while poorly capitalized banks may be overlooked by safe borrowers
and forced to do business with risky customers whose loan demand is relatively volatile. On
the other hand, Ashcraft (2006) presents evidence that bank holding company aﬃliation is
less closely linked to the customer mix, and is to be preferred as an indicator for loan supply
conditions. In this paper, we do not add to this debate. Instead, we consider the range of
characteristics that have been studied in the literature. However, throughout our discussion we
are mindful of the interpretations that can be given to cross eﬀects between monetary policy
and individual bank characteristics.
The monetary policy measure M most often employed is the change in the period average
4Alternatives to the single-step regression model have also been considered in the literature. Kashyap and
Stein (2000) adopt a two-stage procedure, where the cross-sectional sensitivity of lending growth to balance
sheet liquidity is estimated in a ﬁrst stage, and a time series regression relating these cross-sectionally estimated
liquidity constraints to monetary policy is estimated in a second stage. We do not adopt the two-stage approach
in this paper.
5eﬀective federal funds rate, which has been the Federal Reserve’s operating target since at least
1994, and arguably for many episodes since the post-war period.5 Increases in the federal funds
rate target induce leftward shifts of banks’ loan supply schedules via the narrow and broad
lending channels described in the introduction. These raise lending rates and reducing lending
volumes. When the federal funds rate target is increased in response to forecasts of higher
future economic growth and/or inﬂation, estimation of this relationship is no longer straight-
forward. In such circumstances, any loan supply contraction due to tight monetary policy may
coincide with a rightward shift of loan demand, as consumers borrow against expected future
income and ﬁrms invest in response to an improving outlook for proﬁts. The loan demand shift
will attenuate the reduction in lending from a monetary tightening and the β estimated from
equation 1 will not capture the full eﬀect of monetary policy. A similar result may arise via the
eﬀects of expected inﬂation. In particular, reductions in bank lending from a rise in the federal
funds rate may be muted because the demand for loans in nominal units rises with expected
inﬂation. As in the example based on expected economic growth, equilibrium lending is subject
to countervailing eﬀects from loan demand and loan supply, such that the β estimated from
equation 1 is attenuated.
The drivers of endogenous monetary policy may also inﬂuence equilibrium lending via bank
loan supply curves. The availability of non-deposit ﬁnance to banks is likely to vary positively
with expected economic growth. At the start of cyclical upturns, institutional investors (e.g.,
pension funds, sovereign wealth funds) may invest more heavily in equities and loan-backed
securities, at the expense of ﬁxed income assets, given a greater appetite for higher yields and
risk. To the extent that banks use equity issues and the securitization of loans to generate
funding for new lending, loan supply will rise at each level of market interest rates.
Similarly, in models featuring information asymmetries and monitoring costs, loan supply
incorporates an external ﬁnance premium that varies positively with lender risk aversion and
5See Meulendyke (1998) for historical evidence on the Federal Reserve’s policy tool choices. Alternative policy
measures due to Boschen and Mills (1991, 1995) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998) have also been employed in
the literature (Kashyap and Stein, 2000). These measures of policy explicitly address possible changes to the
instrument of policy through time, but remain measures of the endogenous stance of policy. As such, we believe
that the arguments developed in this section are applicable to them. Loutskina (2005) considers the Strongin
(1995) identiﬁcation of exogenous movements in non-borrowed reserves. While this approach controls for reserve
demand shocks, it does not directly control for endogenous policy moves by a forward-looking central bank. Jonas
and King (2008) brieﬂy consider the original Romer and Romer (2004) policy measure, which does control for
policy endogeneity. However, this is used only as a robustness test in a study that focuses on the impact of bank
eﬃciency on lending responses to general federal funds rate movements. The consequences of policy endogeneity
for lending responses are not considered by Jonas and King.
6negatively with borrower net worth (via a collateral eﬀect) (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). Ex-
pansion phases of the business cycle are typically associated with increases in lenders’ risk
appetite and agents’ net worth, such that the external ﬁnance premium falls and loan supply
expands. We do not emphasize any one of these channels ahead of the others. Instead, we
highlight that when loan supply is aﬀected by any one of them, the response of lending growth
to the federal funds rate will be attenuated – the leftward shift of loan supply from tight policy
is oﬀset by a rightward shift of loan supply via one of the channels described. Furthermore, this
will be the case even when controlling for current economic growth and inﬂation. The eﬀect
derives from the fact that expected economic conditions may inﬂuence monetary policy and loan
supply simultaneously.
2.1 Policy endogeneity and bank characteristics
An important question is whether or not pro-cyclical loan demand and loan supply aﬀect the
cross eﬀects in equation 1 that measure heterogeneity in bank lending responses. As discussed
in the introduction, these are the terms that proxy the bank-level ﬁnancial constraints that
underpin the aggregate lending channel of monetary policy. Even if loan demands and supplies
are aﬀected identically across banks by expected macroeconomic conditions, the estimates of
any heterogeneity in bank responses to the exogenous component of monetary policy will be
attenuated. In this case, FF would implicitly introduce measurement error for policy through
its inclusion of endogenous policy changes.
Alternatively, suppose that the attenuation of lending responses to monetary policy varies
systematically with bank characteristics. Then, estimates of equation 1 which use the realized
federal funds rate may either obscure or induce systematic heterogeneity in bank responses
to monetary policy. In this sub-section, we describe three examples of potential biases: (i)
expected macroeconomic conditions induce common loan demand shifts and bank responses
depend upon their characteristics; (ii) expected macroeconomic conditions induce loan demand
shifts that vary with bank characteristics; (iii) expected macroeconomic conditions induce loan
supply shifts that depend on bank characteristics.
Asymmetric responses to common loan demand shifts may arise because bank characteristics
capture access to liquidity. Banks that are able to access liquidity may be able to grow their
7loan portfolio more rapidly following a surge in loan demand. Given that the rise in loan
demand facing each bank occurs against a backdrop of tighter central bank policy (which is
an endogenous response to the underlying drivers of loan demand), the attenuation of bank
lending will be more pronounced amongst the group of banks exhibiting the access-to-liquidity
characteristic. When the realized federal funds rate is used to measure policy, estimates of the
elements of δ from equation 1 will be positively biased and the evidence for heterogeneity in
lending responses to monetary policy will be overstated.
Turning to the second of the three possibilities listed above, Kashyap and Stein (2000)
advocate a rational buﬀer stocking theory to explain a possible correlation between loan demand
curve shifts and bank characteristics. Under the assumption that some banks concentrate their
lending in regions or industries that are especially sensitive to aggregate demand conditions, it
is rational for such banks to select characteristics that help accommodate volatile loan demand
(e.g., bank holding company aﬃliation or high balance sheet liquidity). When the federal funds
rate rises during a cyclical expansion, shifts in individual loan demand curves will be largest
amongst banks exhibiting the characteristic in question. The attenuation of lending growth
reversals following rises in the federal funds rate would then be largest amongst that category
of banks. As in the ﬁrst case discussed, this eﬀect would manifest as positive bias to the
estimate of δ. Evidence that banks with access to liquidity can shield lending growth from
Federal Reserve policy would be overstated.6
The ﬁnal case described above is that of heterogeneous loan supply responses to expected
macroeconomic conditions. Banks that face ﬁnancing constraints, either due to a lack of aﬃli-
ates, assets, or liquidity, may draw more heavily on the funds available during cyclical upturns,
because of the fact that their lending was previously constrained. If this is the case, the right-
ward shifts of their loan supply curves (which counteract the leftward shifts from monetary
tightening) will be larger, such that the net reduction in lending during periods of partially
endogenous monetary tightening will be attenuated. This example is signiﬁcant. It suggests
that the evidence for ﬁnancing constraints amongst banks will be understated when a measure
of the endogenous stance of monetary policy such as the realized federal funds rate is used.
We close this section by noting that these thought experiments raise the possibility that even
6There is a caveat. Banks trading with cyclically sensitive customers also likely face relatively interest rate
elastic loan demand curves, such that cuts in lending from a rise in the federal funds rate will be larger. This
potentially oﬀsets the lending increase arising from a relatively large shift of the loan demand curve.
8a purely exogenous monetary policy measure will elicit estimates of δ that measure something
other than banks’ ability to shield lending growth by virtue of their characteristics. For example,
banks that can access liquidity may face a diﬀerent loan demand elasticity and therefore adjust
their lending diﬀerently for that reason. Some characteristics will be more prone to such eﬀects
than others. Ashcraft (2006) contends that the properties of loan demand are similar across
banks, conditional upon bank holding company status (aﬃliation/non-aﬃliation). As such, a
comparison of lending responses by bank holding company status is more likely to reﬂect genuine
diﬀerences in banks’ access to alternative ﬁnance. We return to this issue when discussing our
empirical results in section 4. The point that we emphasize at this stage is that such eﬀects
impact all measures of monetary policy, both endogenous and exogenous. The main advantage
of considering exogenous policy measures is that their eﬀects on bank lending are less likely to
be aﬀected by the sources of bias discussed in this section.
3 Econometric methodology
In this section, we outline the methods that we use in comparing bank lending responses to
exogenous monetary policy changes with realized federal funds rate changes. We ﬁrst describe
the identiﬁcation procedure used to isolate exogenous variation in the monetary policy rate.
Then, we outline the regression models that underlie our core results. Finally, we describe the
data we use in the estimation.
3.1 Monetary policy identiﬁcation
To identify exogenous variation in the U.S. monetary policy, we follow the two-step procedure
outlined by Romer and Romer (2004), who consider U.S. monetary policy over the period 1969-
1996. In the ﬁrst step, narrative evidence is used to determine the size of the federal funds rate
change targeted by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) at their scheduled meetings.
The advantage of this measure of monetary policy intentions is that during episodes of reserve
targeting (e.g., under Volcker’s chairmanship of the FOMC), it does not respond to supply and
demand shocks in the reserve market that are unrelated to monetary policy. In contrast, the
eﬀective federal funds rate (the market clearing rate in the reserve market) will respond to such
9factors.7
We extend the original Romer and Romer (2004) target series by appending the FOMC’s
announced federal funds target rate changes for 1997-2001. Such announcements began in
February 1994, overlapping with the original Romer and Romer series for 2 years. Although
the announced target series does not capture all of the narrative evidence incorporated in the
Romer and Romer (2004) series, we argue that the pooling of the two is defensible, since the
transparency of policy intentions and the public announcement of policy changes are strongly
related. During the overlapping period of 1994-1996, the two series have a correlation that
is essentially 1.8 The extension of the target rate series in this way ensures that we are able
to recover exogenous variation in U.S. monetary policy for a longer sample period than that
covered by Romer and Romer (2004).
In the second step, the targeted federal funds rate change is regressed upon the Federal
Reserve’s Greenbook (in-house) forecasts for real output growth, inﬂation, and unemployment
over horizons of up to two quarters. These represent the central objective variables of the
Federal Reserve.9 Additionally, we supplement the Greenbook information with measures of
capacity utilization and capacity utilization growth in the month of the FOMC meeting. The
capacity utilization index is constructed by the Federal Reserve. However, it is not available
to policymakers in real-time because the observations for a particular month are inferred by
scaling production indicators with capacity measures interpolated from end-of-year observations
– actual capacity is only benchmarked annually. The empirical relevance of capacity utilization
is emphasized by Giordani (2004), who shows that controlling for such a proxy for production
relative to potential is crucial for accurate policy identiﬁcation. In the present application, we
treat terms in capacity utilization as proxies for latent policymaker perceptions concerning the
cyclical position of the economy, which may contribute to policy decisions even after controlling
7In previous research, the consequences of changes to the operating procedures have been investigated through
comparing results from the eﬀective federal funds rate with those from the Bernanke and Mihov measure of
monetary policy, which accounts for changes to the operating procedure. See Kashyap and Stein (2000) for an
application. We do not pursue that option in this paper.
8There is one instance in which the series diﬀer. For the meeting on September 28, 1994, Romer and Romer
(2004) argue that the language associated with the FOMC transcripts amounted to the intention to tighten by
12.5 basis points, even though there was no change in the announced, target federal funds rate.
9See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2005) or the International Banking Act of 1978 (the
Humphrey-Hawkins Act).
10for the Greenbook forecasts. Formally, we estimate the following regression:
∆ﬀ m = α + βﬀ m−1 +
2 X
j=−1
γj c ∆ym,j +
2 X
j=−1
ηj
￿
c ∆ym,j − c ∆ym−1,j
￿
(2)
+
2 X
j=−1
θjˆ πm,j +
2 X
j=−1
λj (ˆ πm,j − ˆ πm−1,j)
+
2 X
j=−1
µjˆ nm,j +
2 X
j=−1
ρj (ˆ nm,j − ˆ nm−1,j) + τCU m + φCUGm + εm,
where m indexes FOMC meetings, j indexes the forecast quarter relative to the current meeting’s
quarter, ﬀ is the target federal funds rate level, ∆y is real output growth, π is inﬂation, n is the
unemployment rate, CU is the capacity utilization index, CUG is the current monthly growth
rate of capacity utilization (both capacity terms are measured in percentage points), and ε is a
mean-zero error term. A hat denotes the real-time forecast for a variable. All other lowercase
Greek letters denote population parameters. Notice that the speciﬁcation employs a larger set
of unemployment forecasts than Romer and Romer (2004).
The results obtained from estimating equation 2 for a sample of 298 FOMC meetings from
the period 1969-2001 are reported in table 1. The sums of the coeﬃcients on forecast levels are
generally of the same signs as those reported by Romer and Romer (2004), indicating tighter
policy in response to stronger economic activity and higher prices. An exception occurs in the
case of the sum of the coeﬃcients on the growth forecasts, which is negative but insigniﬁcant.
One explanation is that the capacity utilization terms capture information contained in the
growth forecasts (the coeﬃcient on capacity utilization growth is positive and signiﬁcant). The
inclusion of the capacity utilization and additional unemployment terms is also reﬂected in the
regression R2, which is higher than that for the original Romer and Romer (2004) speciﬁcation
(36% as compared to 28%).10
In order for the regression residuals from equation 2 to capture exogenous monetary policy
that is useful in the estimation of bank lending responses, we require that: (i) the Greenbook
forecasts and capacity utilization are not a function of the change in the federal funds rate
target; and, (ii) the Greenbook forecasts and capacity utilization account for any changes to the
target that are endogenous to factors that may inﬂuence bank lending via expected economic
10This may also reﬂect a reduction in the relative variability of the target federal funds rate over the years
1997-2001.
11conditions. The ﬁrst assumption rules out reverse causation in equation 2. As remarked upon
by Romer and Romer (2004), the Greenbook forecasts are generally formulated under the as-
sumption that there is no change in policy stance at least until the FOMC meeting after next,
ruling out this possibility. One caveat is that Greenbook forecasts can draw upon forward-
looking variables (e.g., asset prices, industry surveys) that embody market expectations over
the policy change at the current meeting. In that case, our identiﬁcation requires that output,
inﬂation, unemployment and capacity utilization respond to policy with a suﬃciently long lag
such that the forecasts in equation 2 are not subject to reverse causation.
The second assumption is key in eliminating policy movements that may lead to biased
estimates of lending responses to monetary policy. The Greenbook forecasts are a natural
instrument in achieving this objective because they represent the real-time information available
to policy-makers and are known to perform well relative to alternative forecasts (see Romer and
Romer, 2000, 2008 and Bernanke and Boivin, 2003 for evidence).11 Instances in which the
controls in equation 2 may not eliminate policy movements that are endogenous to lending
determinants occur when the Federal Reserve responds to banking sector conditions directly.
If concerns over bank liquidity prompt the Federal Reserve to keep interest rates on hold even
when Greenbook forecasts point to higher interest rates, a negative monetary policy change
would be recorded. However, this may fail to stimulate lending growth if liquidity concerns
prevent banks from doing new business. In terms of the present application, the banking crisis
that followed the collapse of the sub-prime housing market in 2007 is excluded from the sample.
However, two other relevant episodes are included in the sample: (i) the years surrounding
the Basel I Accord (agreed in 1988 and implemented in 1992), which is often argued to have
prompted bank balance sheet adjustment and a looser monetary policy than would otherwise
have been the case (Ashcraft, 2006); and, (ii) the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s rescue
of U.S. hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, which may have induced
similar eﬀects. In section 5, we provide evidence that our core results are not aﬀected by these
episodes.
11It is of course possible that individual ﬁrms, consumers and banks have information concerning their future
prospects (as opposed to general economic prospects) that is not reﬂected in the Greenbook. However, this
will not lead to estimation bias provided that FOMC decisions regarding the target federal funds rate are not
correlated with such information. In essence, it must be the case that any determinant of monetary policy
decisions (e.g., the views of an inﬂuential FOMC member) does not contain information for loan supply and loan
demand beyond that in the Greenbook.
12For any identiﬁcation scheme, a natural question is: what are the sources of the policy shocks
estimated from equation 2? An important factor is likely to be that interest rate decisions
depend on factors idiosyncratic to FOMC members. For example, even absent a future cyclical
expansion, interest rates may be increased if FOMC members are concerned with their public
reputation (Bluedorn and Bowdler, 2008 discuss a relevant example), possess a private forecast
that points to an expansion that does not transpire (Romer and Romer, 2008), or hold a
view of the economy that leads them to favor larger interest rate rises than are warranted
given the available forecasts (Romer and Romer, 2004). Alternatively, FOMC membership
may change such that policymaker preferences favor tighter or looser policy irrespective of the
cyclical position. In other situations, policymakers may feel obliged to validate market beliefs
over policy, even when such beliefs are incorrect (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999).
It is these federal funds rate adjustments, driven by errors and preference shifts, that we use to
obtain estimates of bank lending responses to monetary policy.
The data on bank lending that we use in our empirical work are reported on a quarterly
basis. Thus, monetary policy changes deﬁned at the frequency of FOMC meetings, which
currently take place eight times per annum, must be aggregated to the quarterly frequency.
The appropriate method of aggregation depends critically on whether the data to be studied
are measured on a quarter-average or quarter-end basis (see Bluedorn and Bowdler, 2008 for
relevant discussion). In the present application, bank-level data are drawn from end-of-quarter
reports ﬁled with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Balance sheet data are
reported for the ﬁnal day of a quarter and banks have up to 30 days in the following quarter
to conﬁrm the ﬁgures reported. To parallel this treatment, we construct a quarterly series for
exogenous monetary policy by cumulating the post-meeting identiﬁed monetary policy changes
at a daily frequency within a particular quarter, to give a variable that we denote UM.12 This
method is equivalent to deﬁning a daily interest rate level from the cumulated value of all past
identiﬁed policy changes and taking the change in the level from the ﬁnal day of the previous
quarter to the ﬁnal day of the current quarter. Accordingly, we use precisely that method to
12To see the importance of consistent end-of-period measurement of balance sheet variables and monetary
policy measures, suppose that lending responds in full to monetary policy within a month. It is then the case
that a monetary policy shock in the third month in a quarter changes lending by the same amount as a shock
observed in the ﬁrst, even though a period average interest rate change would be smaller in the ﬁrst scenario
than in the second. The estimated eﬀect of monetary policy on lending growth would then be distorted.
13obtain analogous quarterly changes in the eﬀective federal funds rate, denoted FF.13 In ﬁgure 1,
we present time series plots for UM and FF. During the sample 1976q2 to 1999q2 the variance
of UM is 76 basis points and that of FF is 157 basis points, suggesting that roughly half the
variation in the eﬀective federal funds rate is eliminated from UM as part of the identiﬁcation
procedure. The correlation of the two series is 0.60.
3.2 Regression speciﬁcation
To evaluate bank lending responses to monetary policy, we estimate regression models of the
form:
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where i indexes banks, t indexes time in quarters, ∆L denotes the change in the natural loga-
rithm of total loans measured at current prices, M is a vector of three macroeconomic variables
(described below), X is a vector of J bank characteristics (described below), Sk is a set of
seasonal dummy variables equal to 1 in quarter k and zero otherwise, and ε is a mean-zero error
term.
The components of vector M are:
1. a monetary policy measure, either UM or FF, as described in section 3.1;
2. the change in the natural log of GDP at current prices;
3. the change in the natural log of the consumer price index (CPI).
The vector of J bank characteristics comprises:
1. the natural log of bank assets in millions of dollars, at current prices;
2. an indicator variable set to unity post−1986 if a bank is part of a bank holding company
and zero otherwise (following Ashcraft, 2006 this characteristic is dated t rather than
13The daily eﬀective federal funds rate data come from the FRED database maintained by the Federal Reserve
Bank of St.Louis.
14t − 1)14
3. the ratio of bank securities to assets;
4. the ratio of total equity capital to assets;
5. the ratio of internal cash generation to assets.
For the interaction terms, the components of M are broken out (denoted Mq,t for q ∈ {1,2,3}).
We give the exact variable deﬁnitions and data sources in section 3.3.
The regression speciﬁcation in equation 3 is closely related to those employed by Ashcraft
(2006) and Loutskina (2005). Once-lagged bank characteristics are included as controls, to allow
for diﬀerences in lending growth conditional upon bank size, holding company aﬃliation, and
balance sheet composition. The growth and inﬂation controls in the vector M account for vari-
ations in nominal lending growth arising from contemporaneous changes in prices and economic
activity. Interactions between the macroeconomic variables and bank characteristics capture
heterogeneity in bank lending responses to monetary policy, income growth, and inﬂation.
There are three points that we highlight in relation to equation 3. First, the interactions
between macroeconomic variables and bank characteristics feature measures of characteristics
dated t−1, except in the case of the bank holding company dummy which is dated t. As such,
lending decisions in period t are conditional on characteristics that are pre-determined. They
are thus less likely to be inﬂuenced by current lending behavior (the bank holding company
indicator is not pre-determined, but it is not derived from the bank balance sheet). This
structure mirrors that in Ashcraft (2006) and Loutskina (2005). A natural alternative would be
to date interacted characteristics t−j−1 such that they are also pre-determined with respect to
the monetary policy measure. We consider this case in our robustness tests in section 5. As we
discuss there, the results change very little due to the fact that the variation in characteristics
across quarters close in time is small relative to the cross-sectional variation in characteristics.15
14The indicator recognizes holding company status only in the post-1986 period, to reﬂect the inception of
the Federal Reserve’s source of strength doctrine, which underpins the interpretation of holding companies as
credit networks through requiring that dominant holding company banks support their aﬃliates during periods
of ﬁnancial stress. Ashcraft (2008) shows that in practice, the functioning of internal capital markets improved
signiﬁcantly in 1989. However, we focus on the post−1986 period as in Ashcraft (2006).
15While we consider characteristics that are pre-determined for the current lending response to monetary policy,
we make no claim to have identiﬁed exogenous variation in characteristics. In line with most of the literature, we
do not model bank characteristics. The determinants of characteristics may include the properties of previous
monetary policy regimes, raising the possibility that the eﬀects of policy on bank lending are more complex
15Second, each of the bank characteristics (excepting the binary variable for bank holding
company status) are demeaned. Thus, the ﬁrst component of the vector
P4
j=0βj measures the
percentage change in lending a year after a 100 basis point (b.p.) monetary policy contraction
for an unaﬃliated bank at the sample mean of each characteristic (this overlooks contributions
from autoregressive terms, a point to which we return in section 4). The qth component (q ≤ J)
of the vector
P4
j=0 δ1,j measures the increment to the marginal lending response to a monetary
contraction when the qth characteristic is 1 unit above the sample mean (or a bank is aﬃliated
with a holding company in the case of that characteristic).
Third, in addition to the levels of nominal income growth and inﬂation, the regression
includes a full set of interactions between those variables and bank characteristics. This ensures
that heterogeneity in bank lending responses to monetary policy is estimated after controlling
for: (i) purely nominal eﬀects on lending growth from inﬂation; and, (ii) heterogeneity in the
response of real lending growth to macroeconomic factors like output growth and inﬂation.16
The ﬁnal elements of the regression speciﬁcation are a set of seasonal dummies and a time
trend (although macro variables are seasonally adjusted, bank-level variables are not). The
trend is included to deal with the fact that total assets (a bank characteristic) drifts through
time whereas other variables are growth rates or ratios.17. We do not include separate trends
for any drift in the interactions between macroeconomic variables and total assets. In section 5,
we implement a diﬀerent approach to dealing with the drift in total assets to handle any such
eﬀects.
The maximum lag order in the benchmark regression speciﬁcation is 4, which is typical of
micro bank lending regressions using quarterly data (see inter alia Kashyap and Stein, 2000,
Ashcraft, 2006 and Loutskina, 2005). Lags in the dependent variable control for serial correlation
in the data that is not eliminated by the control variables. Similar to Ashcraft (2006), we
calculate all regression standard errors through clustering at the bank-level to deal with any
residual heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form.18 One source of uncertainty
than our estimates indicate. It could even be the case that past values of a bank characteristic are endogenous
to current monetary policy (e.g., via an expectations eﬀect). Any resulting estimation biases are likely to be
less important in the case of UM than in the case of FF, because the former is less easily predicted due to its
orthogonality to economic forecasts.
16Inﬂation may aﬀect real lending volumes if loan contracts are not fully inﬂation-indexed.
17Given the short time series for some panels, we do not undertake a full unit-root analysis.
18Wooldridge (2003) notes the importance of clustering in panels that explain micro responses to macro shocks,
as in the present case.
16that our standard errors do not take into account is the ﬁrst stage regression used to identify
UM. However, Pagan (1984) demonstrated that this uncertainty only aﬀects inference based on
non-zero null hypotheses – inference based on zero null hypotheses remains valid.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Bank-level data
Our bank-level data are from the Reports of Condition and Income (“Call Reports”) submitted
to the FDIC at the end of each quarter by all insured banks in the United States.19 The variable
deﬁnitions that we outline follow those used in Ashcraft (2006). The Call Report line numbers
used to generate individual series are provided in Kashyap and Stein (2000).
The dependent variable is derived from a series for total loans minus allowances for loan
losses. This deﬁnition spans ﬁve major categories of loans (residential, consumer, commercial
and industrial, agricultural, and municipal). It includes loans under commitment for some pe-
riod (predominantly lines of credit to ﬁrms), as well as loans on ﬂexible terms.20 The correction
for loan losses allows for the fact that a bank may reduce its loan book by writing oﬀ bad loans,
as well as through varying the supply of new credit. However, as discussed by Ashcraft (2001)
and Peek and Rosengren (1998), our measure of loans does not control for loans being moved
oﬀ bank balance sheets via securitization. In our case, distortions to lending growth via securi-
tization should be limited since our sample ends in 1999. This includes only a few years of the
period of growth in the market for mortgage-backed securities which started in the mid-1990s.
Consistent with this view, we show in section 4.2 that our results change little after controlling
for the commercial and industrial loan share. Any data distortions from securitization should
be minimized for this sub-sample, since relatively few loans from this category are securitized
(Loutskina, 2005).
Total bank assets are reported net of loan loss reserves and form the basis for measuring
balance sheet composition, across securities, equity capital and cash ﬂow (each of these terms
is measured relative to total assets). Bank securities are the sum of Total Investment Securities
19We are grateful to Adam Ashcraft for providing a dataset containing variables constructed from these sources
using guidelines proposed by Kashyap and Stein (2000). Some series are dropped from the Call Reports during
the period considered, while others are added. See Kashyap and Stein (2000) for notes on how such changes were
handled.
20The data include international lending from 1978 onwards.
17and Assets Held in Trading Accounts. Total Equity Capital is the book value of equity issued
plus the cumulated value of retained earnings. Internal cash ﬂow is the sum of net income
before extraordinary items and loan loss provisions (this deﬁnition follows Ashcraft, 2006, who
cites Houston, James, and Marcus, 1997).21 The indicator for bank holding company status is
taken from Ashcraft (2006), who identiﬁes holding companies from sets of banks that have the
same regulatory holder identiﬁcation number.
In table 2, we report summary statistics for the bank-level variables and measures of loan
composition by customer type. Summary statistics are calculated using data from three years
corresponding to the beginning, middle and end of the sample (1977, 1988 and 1999), for
all banks in the baseline estimation sample (see section 3.3.3 below). An inspection of these
statistics supports our treatment of the series as stationary, with the exception of the total
assets measure (see the discussion in section 3.2).
3.3.2 Macroeconomic data
The series for income growth is constructed from seasonally adjusted current price GDP, and
that for the inﬂation rate is from the seasonally adjusted CPI. Both series are from the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and were extracted from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis’s FRED database. The output and price data are period average values. They refer to a
ﬂow of transactions within a particular quarter, whereas our bank-level data are end-of-quarter
values from stock concepts on balance sheet statements. Unlike the interest rate series, for
which we can examine data for the ﬁnal day from a particular quarter, there are no end-of-
period concepts for output and prices. This measurement mismatch could in theory limit the
extent to which current output and inﬂation control for the endogeneity of the federal funds
rate. However, in section 5, we show that our results are robust to measuring the realized
federal funds rate on a period average basis that matches the output and inﬂation concepts.
21Each of the balance sheet characteristics are aﬀected by the fact that prior to 1984, aggregates for certain
asset and liability classes are not reported. They are therefore proxied through summing their relevant sub-
components. For example, through 1983, Total Investment Securities is proxied by the sum of securities on the
balance sheet from diﬀerent issuers. See Kashyap and Stein (2000) for a full discussion.
183.3.3 Sample description
The dataset used for our baseline estimations is an unbalanced quarterly panel spanning 1976q2
to 1999q2. It features a maximum of 14,026 banks. The average number of observations
per bank is 56.9 quarters. In line with other studies, this sample is obtained after excluding
bank/quarter observations aﬀected by mergers, since they may induce spurious movements in
balance sheet variables (following a merger the merged banks are dropped and a new bank
enters the dataset).22 In order to deal with other exceptional movements in the data, we
follow Ashcraft (2006) in ﬁtting our benchmark regression by OLS for the largest possible
sample and then eliminating outliers. These are deﬁned as observations for which the absolute
DFITS statistic (the scaled diﬀerence between the ﬁtted values for the nth observation when
the regression is ﬁtted with and without the nth observation) exceeds the threshold 2
q
K
N,
where K is the total number of explanatory variables and N is the overall sample size (Welsch
and Kuh, 1977). The number of observations excluded depends on whether the regression is
ﬁtted using UM or FF. Speciﬁcally, from a total sample of 1,079,960 observations we reduce the
sample to 1,053,334 observations when UM is the policy measure and 1,052,453 observations
when FF is the policy measure.23 These diﬀerences are minor in the context of the sample size.
We emphasize that our results across UM and FF do not depend on outlier exclusion. The
comparisons presented in the next section are observed when using either the full or trimmed
samples.
4 Empirical results
In table 3, we present
PI
i=0 βi for I = 0,1,..,4 and the associated standard errors, for the
two policy measures UM and FF. These statistics measure the percentage change in lending at
various horizons following a 100 b.p. tightening at a bank that has the sample average balance
sheet characteristics and is not aﬃliated with a holding company (we refer to such a bank as the
representative bank). The full lending response also depends on the autoregressive parameters,
but each of these is small (less than 0.1) and virtually identical across UM and FF versions of
22Due to consolidation of the banking sector, the number of banks falls to roughly 8,000 by the end of the
sample – see table 2.
23The outlier exclusion procedure oﬀers some robustness against certain changes to variable deﬁnitions that
occur during the sample which are documented by Kashyap and Stein (2000).
19the regression. As such, they do not aﬀect our inferences. We follow Kishan and Opiela (2000),
Loutskina (2005) and Ashcraft (2006) in reporting the direct eﬀect of policy on lending.
At each of the horizons considered, the lending reduction estimated from an exogenous
monetary policy contraction exceeds that from a policy contraction measured by the realized
federal funds rate. Furthermore, the precision associated with our estimates is such that 95%
conﬁdence intervals for the two estimates are non-overlapping at all horizons beyond the current
quarter. The diﬀerence between lending responses to UM and FF is most stark at the one and
two quarter horizons. This comes from the fact that lending declines after an exogenous policy
tightening are most rapid during this period, before decelerating at horizons closer to one year.
In contrast, quarterly changes in loans following a rise in FF are smoother, reﬂecting a more
gradual eﬀect on bank lending behavior. The inertia in aggregate lending estimated from FF has
been attributed to factors such as loans under commitment, which may thwart the withdrawal
of bank credit to ﬁrms – see Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Morgan (1998) and Kishan and
Opiela (2000). While such a possibility is plausible, our estimates suggest that at least part of
the sluggishness in bank lending behavior is attributable to policy changes that are endogenous
to other macroeconomic fundamentals. Controlling for extraneous loan demand and loan supply
movements that may be linked to these fundamentals reveals a faster and quantitatively more
important monetary transmission mechanism via credit markets.
The eﬀects of bank size and holding company status
In table 4, we report the sums of cross eﬀects between monetary policy and bank characteristics
through horizon 4 (labeled interaction) when characteristics are set at 1 standard deviation
of their sample distribution (except in the case of the holding company indicator which is set
to unity). Sums of coeﬃcients for other horizons are not reported given space constraints.
However, they are consistent with the UM/FF comparisons developed below. To provide some
context for our results, we also reproduce the horizon 4 lending response for the representative
bank, as seen in table 3. We consider the marginal lending response to a 100 b.p. policy
contraction for a bank that is one standard deviation above the sample mean for each of the
characteristics considered. This is the sum of the response at the representative bank and the
20interaction eﬀect for a particular characteristic.24
We ﬁrst focus on the results for total assets and the bank holding company indicator. In
both cases, the sums of the interaction terms are positive, indicating that the characteristics
help banks shield their lending growth from policy contractions. These eﬀects are much larger
when monetary policy is measured using UM as opposed to FF. Controlling for the endogene-
ity of monetary policy implies not only more powerful lending responses at the representative
bank, but also a greater dispersion in lending responses across the population of banks. This is
consistent with our argument in section 2 that lending responses to the endogenous drivers of
policy likely correlate with bank characteristics. In the present case, it appears that lending by
small banks and banks not aﬃliated with holding companies is more responsive to factors like
expected economic growth, such that lending responses to monetary policy are attenuated to a
greater extent amongst banks exhibiting such characteristics. As discussed in section 2, a possi-
ble reason for this is that cyclical upturns provide access to ﬁnance that is used more intensively
by banks that cannot access other sources of funds due to credit market imperfections.
The ﬁndings have important implications. Ashcraft (2006) argues that the composition of
loan demand by borrower size and creditworthiness varies relatively little with holding company
status, especially when compared with other characteristics such as total assets and leverage.
Therefore, heterogeneity in lending responses associated with holding company status is more
readily interpreted as evidence for diﬀerential loan supply responses of the sort predicted by the
theory of the bank lending channel. The more powerful holding company eﬀect estimated from
the exogenous policy measure raises the possibility that the lending channel is quantitatively
more important than previously believed.
As discussed by Ashcraft, an important caveat is that although unaﬃliated banks may be
subject to a lending channel, the borrowers turned away from such banks may be accommo-
dated by bank holding company networks, whose funds ﬁll the gap in the market. The aggregate
lending channel of monetary policy could then be weak or non-existent. Our estimates indicate
that after an exogenous policy contraction the representative unaﬃliated bank reduces lending
0.94 percentage points in the ﬁrst year, while the representative aﬃliated bank raises lending
0.95 percentage points over the same period. This evidence is consistent with a redistribution
24In the case of the bank holding company indicator, the marginal eﬀect is calculated for a bank that belongs
to a holding company.
21of lending in the aftermath of shocks to bank funding.25 To investigate whether the counter-
vailing loan responses oﬀset at the aggregate level, we re-estimated our baseline regression after
excluding all terms from the vector of bank characteristics X, to obtain the marginal eﬀect
of a policy tightening for a bank at the sample average of all characteristics, including hold-
ing company status. The lending reduction from UM (standard error in parentheses) is 0.36
percentage points (0.03) and that from FF is 0.17 percentage points (0.01). Thus, despite the
compensating eﬀect from aﬃliated banks, it appears that an aggregate transmission mechanism
exists. Furthermore, this mechanism is twice as strong when estimated from UM.
The much sharper heterogeneity in bank lending behavior from UM may help explain two
important features of the aggregate transmission mechanism. These are: (i) the diﬀerent eﬀects
of policy across regions and industries (Carlino and DeFina, 1998); and, (ii) a possible trend
towards weaker propagation of monetary policy in recent decades (Boivin and Giannoni, 2002).
Ashcraft (2006) presents weak evidence that state level lending responses to federal funds rate
rises depend on the proportion of loans issued by aﬃliated banks. However, he ﬁnds that
similar eﬀects do not carry over to state income responses. The larger cross eﬀects that we
estimate from exogenous monetary policy suggest that much more of the heterogeneity in the
aggregate eﬀects of monetary policy may be attributable to banking sector structure than
previous estimates suggest, particularly in light of the evidence that loan supply reductions by
small banks exert larger eﬀects on economic activity than do reductions by large banks (Hancock
and Wilcox, 1998). Similarly, our results suggest that there is more scope for banking sector
consolidation and the growth of bank holding companies to account for possible trends towards a
weaker aggregate monetary transmission mechanism in recent decades.26 The relevance of these
conjectures depends on the precise conﬁguration of banking sector characteristics. Speciﬁcally,
a region or episode associated with a banking sector dominated by holding companies must not
25These estimates are from our baseline regression speciﬁcation, which contrasts aﬃliated and non-aﬃliated
banks, assuming all other characteristics remain unchanged. It is of course possible that the switch to bank holding
company status is associated with changes to other bank characteristics that aﬀect bank lending responses at
the margin. However, if we exclude all bank characteristics other than holding company status, to estimate
the unconditional eﬀect of aﬃliation, the ﬁnding that holding company banks raise lending at the expense of
stand-alone banks remains intact.
26A caveat should be noted in relation to the interaction eﬀect based on bank assets. Our assertions rest on
interpreting the diﬀerential eﬀects by bank assets in terms of loan supply. Ashcraft (2006) argues convincingly
that the slope of the loan demand curve varies with bank assets (larger banks trade with customers whose loan
demand is less interest rate sensitive). Therefore, part of the interaction between monetary policy and assets that
we estimate could reﬂect heterogeneity in loan demand. It is less clear that such a feature of lending markets
could drive heterogeneity in the aggregate transmission mechanism. We implicitly assume that at least part of
the asset-based interaction arises from loan supply eﬀects.
22be associated with other characteristics that reverse the impact of holding company aﬃliation
on lending responses. We hope to address these questions in future research.
The eﬀects of balance sheet composition
The most striking result that we present in table 4 relates to the securities-to-assets ratio.
Following a 100 b.p. increase in the exogenous policy measure, a bank with securities one
standard deviation above the mean reduces lending by a further 0.22 percentage points compared
to the representative bank. In contrast, following a 100 b.p. increase in the realized federal
funds rate, a bank with securities one standard deviation above the mean shields lending by
0.04 percentage points relative to the average bank. The UM interaction is signiﬁcant at the 1%
level and the FF interaction is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In previous work, the shielding eﬀect
from securities has been related to the idea that such holdings are a buﬀer stock of liquid assets
which can be used to substitute lost reserves during policy contractions (Kashyap and Stein,
2000; Ashcraft, 2006). Our results suggest the empirical support for such an interpretation
comes from a confounding of expected future growth and inﬂation with the monetary policy
stance.
A possible explanation for the negative eﬀect of monetary policy tightening upon lending
for banks with large securities-to-assets ratios follows. An exogenous rise in interest rates is
likely to raise the long end of the yield curve and depress securities prices, such that banks
suﬀer a capital loss – see Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for a discussion of this eﬀect. Banks
with greater exposure to capital losses on securities will be forced to contract lending more
aggressively, leading to an ampliﬁcation eﬀect. In such instances, seemingly liquid assets such
as securities exhibit low ‘market liquidity,’ in the sense that their market value is driven below
their fundamental value. As a result, banks may refrain from liquidating the assets and instead
choose to contract their lending.
The ﬁnal two rows in table 4 relate to the equity capital and net cash ratios. We consider
these two characteristics together since cash ﬂow contributes to equity capital. However, we
focus upon the equity capital ratio since it is a more comprehensive indicator of the liquid funds
available to banks. Both characteristics play a role in shielding bank lending from exogenous
policy contractions. A bank that is one standard deviation above the mean equity capital
23ratio trims one quarter less from its lending following a rise in UM. In our results, it is equity
capital that makes bank lending resilient to contractionary open market operations, not holdings
of securities, which have typically been interpreted as a buﬀer against funding shocks.27 As
the diﬀerence between a bank’s assets and explicit liabilities, equity capital is an indicator
of the amount of liquidity on banks’ balance sheets. Signiﬁcantly, the value of liquid assets
represented by equity capital does not appears to erode in response to tight monetary policy
(unlike securities). Therefore, the full value of liquid assets is available to substitute lost reserves,
and hence sustain deposits and loans, during periods of tight policy.28 Estimates in the ﬁnal
row in table 4 indicate that current cash ﬂow relative to assets (approximately the current
period increment to the equity capital share) plays an especially important role in shielding
lending growth from exogenous policy contractions. This may reﬂect greater resilience to policy
contractions amongst banks that are relatively proﬁtable and able to use operating surpluses
to support lending activities.
Our corresponding results based on the realized federal funds rate provide an interesting
contrast with the results from UM. The interaction between equity capital and FF is smaller and
less signiﬁcant than that from UM, while the interaction between the net cash ratio and FF is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In annual data regressions, Ashcraft (2006) estimates a negative
and marginally signiﬁcant equity capital interaction and a positive and signiﬁcant cash ratio
interaction. Using quarterly data and regressions for banks from diﬀerent size and capitalization
classes, Kishan and Opiela (2000) ﬁnd that equity capital mitigates lending responses to FF
amongst small banks (consistent with a positive interaction), but also some evidence that it
can amplify lending responses amongst large banks (consistent with a negative interaction).
The generally weaker evidence for a shielding eﬀect from equity capital when using the realized
federal funds rate may arise because loan responses are attenuated following endogenous policy
changes. Moreover, they may be attenuated to a greater extent amongst poorly capitalized
27Ashcraft (2006) argues that the interest rate sensitivity of loan demand decreases with bank capitalization,
which may account for some or all of the positive interaction between UM and the equity capital ratio. However,
both Ashcraft and Kishan and Opiela (2000) present evidence that the shielding eﬀect of policy is not weakened
even if loan composition measures that are thought to proxy the elasticity of loan demand are controlled for.
28Kashyap and Stein (2000) question the interpretation of cash on the balance sheet as a liquidity buﬀer on
the grounds that cash holdings may reﬂect required reserves that cannot be freely drawn down. It is important
to emphasize that we use the equity capital share in assets relative to the sample mean. Therefore, our results
show that equity capital helps to shield lending growth not when it is high in an absolute sense (which could be
the case simply because a bank is large and holds lots of loans and hence reserves), but when it is high relative to
assets amongst the population of banks, likely indicating an excess of liquidity relative to the required amount.
24banks, since they likely expand loan supply more in response to the factors associated with
endogenous policy tightening (see the discussion in section 2.1).
We draw attention to two implications of our ﬁnding that well-capitalized banks are able to
shield their lending from exogenous monetary policy. First, banks that are unable to smooth
their lending using funds from associate networks (e.g., holding companies) may be able to
mitigate any lending contractions through the accumulation of equity capital buﬀers. At the
end of our sample, the average equity capital ratio for stand-alone banks is 4 percentage points
higher than for holding company banks, which is consistent with this idea (other interpretations
of this observation are possible – e.g., the probability of joining a holding company may be linked
to the equity capital ratio). Second, reductions in banking sector equity capital from loan write-
oﬀs during the recent housing market collapse and credit crunch may leave banks less able to
shield their lending from contractionary monetary policy. This in turn may embed a more
powerful monetary transmission mechanism until banks restore their capitalization ratios to
levels seen prior to the current period of ﬁnancial market turmoil.
4.1 Stability of the baseline results
An important issue in any study of monetary policy transmission to the banking sector is
the temporal stability of the results – see Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Kashyap and Stein
(2000) and Ashcraft (2006). In our sample, an important structural change may arise from
the introduction of the source of strength doctrine (Ashcraft, 2006).29 The Federal Reserve
Board issued a formal statement in April 1987 indicating that failure by a parent bank to inject
liquidity into a ﬁnancially distressed subsidiary when funds are available would be considered
an unsafe banking practice.30
In section 3.2, we argued that from 1987 onwards membership in a bank holding company
should aﬀect lending responses to monetary policy. Our baseline results are consistent with this
29Another source of structural change is the abolition of regulation Q, which restricted banks’ ability to
vary interest rates in order to attract deposits (a source of funding). The abolition of this restriction was
largely implemented via the Monetary Control Act of 1980, and is therefore likely to induce heterogeneity in our
results across a much shorter period than the source of strength doctrine. Due to the limitations in estimating
heterogeneity in our results across a period of just three years or so, we do not address the eﬀects of regulation
Q. If observations from this period exerted undue inﬂuence on the results, the outlier detection procedure we
employ ought to diagnose them.
30As noted in footnote 12, Ashcraft (2008) shows that the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and En-
forcement Act of 1989 unexpectedly strengthened the source of strength doctrine. Given that this change occurred
just two years after 1987, we do not allow for a further structural change in 1989.
25idea. In this sub-section, we take our analysis of the eﬀects of the source of strength of doctrine
one stage further. We interact each of the cross terms in
P4
j=0 X′
i,t−1Mq,t−jδq,j,∀q ∈ {1,2,3}
with a binary variable that is set to unity post-1986 for banks that belong to a holding company
(excluding the cross term that already features the holding company indicator). These extra
terms are added to our baseline regression in 3. In table 5, we report interaction coeﬃcients for
policy measures and characteristics (similar to those in table 4), in addition to the changes to
the interaction coeﬃcients associated with the start of the source of strength doctrine.
The key feature of the results is that the post-1986 changes to the interaction coeﬃcients
(amongst holding company banks) are of approximately equal magnitude but opposite sign to
the main interaction eﬀects (the one exception is the interaction of FF with bank assets). As
such, the total eﬀect of balance sheet related characteristics on lending responses to monetary
policy, both exogenous and endogenous, is close to zero during the second half of the sample
for aﬃliated banks (and recall that aﬃliated banks represent over two thirds of all banks in
this period). During the late 1980s and the 1990s, the principal source of heterogeneity in
lending responses to monetary policy is aﬃliation with a holding company, not balance sheet
composition. The roles of security holdings in amplifying and equity capital in mitigating
the eﬀects of exogenous policy on lending growth, are quantitatively smaller from the late
1980s onwards because they are observed only amongst banks that cannot access the ﬁnancing
networks provided by holding companies. In contrast, when aﬃliated banks face write-downs in
securities prices or loan values following policy tightenings, they are able to tap loanable funds
within the network, thus shielding their lending growth.
4.2 Loan composition eﬀects
In this sub-section, we consider information on the composition of bank loan books. The Call
Reports provide information on bank loans across ﬁve categories: residential loans, commercial
and industrial loans, individual (consumer) loans, agricultural loans and municipal loans – see
table 2 for some summary statistics relevant to our sample. This information is relevant to
lending responses for a number of reasons. First, loans that are at least partially collateralized
are more easily sold via the securitization process. In such instances, banks eﬀectively serve as
warehouses for loans and may liquidate them in response to funding shocks (Strahan, 2008).31
31This has not been the case for sub-prime loans during the ﬁnancial crisis that started in 2007.
26Collateral is a more common feature of loans to customers in the residential and consumer
sectors. Banks concentrating in those areas may be more able to shield their lending growth
from monetary policy via securitization.32 Second, it is possible that the interest rate sensitivity
of loan demand varies across sectors of the market. For instance, the shorter maturity of
commercial and industrial loans may render them more responsive to monetary policy (Kishan
and Opiela, 2000). Equally, the pro-cyclicality of loan demand and loan supply, which we
discussed in section 2, may vary across sectors. For instance, consumer loan demand may
respond more strongly to income expectations. If such heterogeneity is a feature of the banking
system, it can be captured using information on loan composition.
We take the total loan shares for residential loans, consumer loans and commercial and
industrial loans, and introduce them as additional bank characteristics in our baseline regression,
equation 3. We consider just three elements of the loan decomposition from the Call Reports,
since municipal lending is typically a small share of total lending. The four remaining loan
categories account for almost 100% of bank lending and as such are nearly collinear. In order
to handle this, we omit the agricultural loan share. In table 6, we report output analogous to
that in table 4. The responsiveness of bank lending to a 100 b.p. tightening is reported for the
representative bank. We also report the increments to the lending response associated with a
loan share measure that is one standard deviation above the mean share for loans of that type.
We do not report results for the bank characteristics discussed previously, but they conﬁrm
those presented in tables 3 and 4 (details available upon request).
Using changes in the realized federal funds rate, a bank whose participation in the residential
loan market is one standard deviation above the mean contracts their lending by roughly twice
as much as a bank that does an average amount of business in that market. A similar result
holds for banks whose business is concentrated in the consumer loans market. In contrast,
commercial lending is only slightly more responsive to federal funds rate rises than the average
loan, and by implication agricultural loans must be less responsive to policy than loans in
general. These results are consistent with those reported by Kishan and Opiela, who show that
residential and consumer lending at small and poorly capitalized banks contracts more rapidly
than commercial lending.
32Loutskina (2005) develops a more precise measure of the securitizability of bank loan books that incorporates
information on the extent of securitization of diﬀerent loan categories at the aggregate level, as well as the
composition of bank loan portfolios.
27The results estimated using UM indicate quite diﬀerent eﬀects of monetary policy by loan
type. The reduction in the sensitivity of lending growth to monetary policy amongst banks
whose participation in the residential loan market is one standard deviation above the mean
is 0.13 percentage points when policy is measured using UM, compared to 0.04 when policy is
measured using FF.33 The changes to the responsiveness of bank lending growth to monetary
policy when banks’ operations are concentrated in the market for consumer loans are 0.05 and
-0.24 percentage points for UM and FF respectively. Although the shielding of loan growth
following a rise in UM is signiﬁcant only at the 15% level, it provides a stark contrast with the
FF case which suggests lending contracts by more at banks whose business is concentrated in
the consumer sector. Kishan and Opiela report a similar result using the eﬀective federal funds
rate. On the other hand, the UM measure suggests slightly stronger shielding of commercial
and industrial loans than consumer loans, even though the former are less readily securitized.
We leave detailed examination of these results for future research.
5 Robustness
In this section, we report the results of robustness exercises performed for our baseline regression
estimates presented in tables 3 and 4. First, in section 3.1 we noted that the policy measure
UM may not eliminate endogenous policy movements during episodes in which the FOMC set
interest rates in light of banking sector conditions. The episodes during which such a critique
seems reasonable for our sample are: (i) the tightening of bank capital regulations due to the
Basel I Accord, which may have induced less restrictive monetary policy than would have been
implemented based on growth and inﬂation objectives alone; and, (ii) the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York’s rescue of the hedge fund LTCM in the late 1990s, which may have prompted
a similar policy response. We deﬁne two separate dummy variables, one equal to unity for
all quarters in the period 1990-1993 (Ashcraft, 2006 uses a similar dummy variable), and the
second equal to unity for all quarters in 1998-1999 (the LTCM rescue occurred in 1998). We
then interacted these dummy variables with each of the terms from equation 3 that feature a
monetary policy measure, and estimated the extended speciﬁcation using the procedure outlined
in section 3. The results from this exercise, for both UM and FF, are presented in the ﬁrst
33The result using FF contrasts with that reported by Kishan and Opiela (2000) who show that residential
lending at small and poorly capitalized banks contracts more rapidly than commercial lending.
28column of table 7. The eﬀect of monetary policy on lending growth at the representative
bank increases in absolute size only marginally, indicating little evidence that the estimated
eﬀects of monetary policy were attenuated during the two episodes considered. The interaction
coeﬃcients are in line with those presented in table 4, and the comparison of interaction eﬀects
across UM and FF supports each of the main results described in section 4.
In the second column in table 7, we report results obtained after augmenting equation
3 with bank-level ﬁxed eﬀects. Although substantial ﬁxed eﬀects are unlikely given that we
model loan growth rather than total loans, we consider this robustness exercise given that
it has been applied elsewhere in the literature. For example, Loutskina (2005) motivates a
ﬁxed eﬀects lending growth speciﬁcation based on diﬀerences in managerial preferences.34 The
results indicate that our main ﬁndings are generally robust to this model extension. A possible
exception occurs in the case of the lending response at the representative bank, which narrows
such that the intervals spanned after imposing two standard error bands around the point
estimates are overlapping. However, this is mainly due to the selected reporting horizon. At
other horizons in the ﬁrst year after a monetary tightening the lending reduction from UM is
more than twice that from FF and intervals formed from two standard error bands are non-
overlapping. Another caveat to be noted is that the shielding eﬀect from bank holding company
membership is just one-sixth larger when estimated from UM as opposed to FF, whereas in our
baseline results it was more than 1.5 times as large. Nevertheless, the precision with which the
eﬀects are estimated ensures that the intervals formed after imposing two standard error bands
around the estimates are non-overlapping, matching our baseline results.
The third robustness test addresses the fact that in equation 3 each of the bank character-
istics interacted with a monetary policy measure are dated t−1, even when the policy measure
is dated somewhat earlier (e.g., t − 4). The dating of characteristics in our baseline regressions
is standard in the literature, but it leaves open the possibility that a characteristic value is a
function of the earlier policy change with which it is interacted. In order to address this issue
we date all characteristics in interaction terms t − j − 1, such that they are pre-determined
with respect to the policy variable with which they are interacted (the level characteristics,
34The inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects and autoregressive terms raises the possibility of estimation bias of the form
discussed by Nickell (1981). However, the size of this bias declines with the time dimension of the panel, and in
our case an average number of time observations per bank of 57 likely means that this bias is minimal. Judson
and Owen (1999) ﬁnd quantitatively small bias provided T ≥ 30. Interestingly, the autoregressive coeﬃcients
change very little across the baseline and ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations (results not reported).
29which enter the regression just once, continue to be dated t−1). The results from this exercise,
performed for both UM and FF, are reported in the third column in table 7.
Our main ﬁndings are robust, except in two cases. First, the ampliﬁcation of the contrac-
tionary eﬀects of UM associated with large security holdings is absent in the third set of results,
signaling the need for some caution in relation to this ﬁnding. Interestingly, the negative in-
teraction between UM and the securities ratio is observed if we cumulate the interaction terms
out to horizon 3 rather than horizon 4, and is present out to horizon 4 if we use the larger
sample that does not exclude outliers. Second, the interactions between the policy measures
and the net cash ratio change sign in column 3 relative to the baseline case. The eﬀect of bank
proﬁtability/cash ﬂow on lending responses to monetary policy is more dependent on the dating
of the characteristic than are the eﬀects of other characteristics. This is unsurprising since the
net cash ratio, closely linked to proﬁts, is less persistent than other components of assets. It
therefore changes more through time (the relatively low persistence of this series is reﬂected in
its large coeﬃcient of variation, calculable from table 2). One interpretation of our previous
result for the net cash ratio is that policy shocks exert a large and persistent eﬀect on the lend-
ing of a certain group of banks, which then reduces their proﬁtability and net cash ratio. The
relatively large lending reversal for this set of banks then correlates with a low equity capital
ratio, yielding the positively signed interaction from this characteristic in table 4. In table 7,
this positively signed interaction is absent because the characteristics are pre-determined with
respect to monetary policy and cannot respond to policy changes. Given this possible interpre-
tation of the net cash ratio interaction, we do not emphasize our results from this particular
characteristic, focusing instead on those related to total assets, holding company status, and
the balance sheet shares of securities and equity capital.
In the ﬁnal column in table 7, we present a version of our baseline results that uses an
alternative deﬁnition of the total assets variable. This is the demeaned series for ln
￿
assetsi,t
assetst
￿
where assetst is the cross-sectional mean of assets in period t (in the baseline case, we use the
demeaned series for ln(assetsi,t)). Scaling each observation by the cross-sectional mean of bank
assets at each point in time eliminates the drift in assets that occurs as a result of bank balance
sheets growing in nominal terms through time. In the baseline results, this eﬀect was handled
via the inclusion of a time trend, an approach that is standard in the literature (e.g., Loutskina,
302005). Such a method will account for a linear trend in the assets of a representative bank, but
it does not deal with changes to the average growth rate for bank assets. We use the alternative
deﬁnition in all terms that feature assets (including the interaction terms), so that the new set
of results does not reﬂect any common, time-varying drift in the data for total assets.
Our core results remain intact using the new measure of assets, except that the interaction
between bank assets turns negative and marginally signiﬁcant when UM is the policy measure,
and negative and signiﬁcant when FF is the policy measure. It appears that the evidence
that large banks can shield their lending growth from monetary policy is partly a function
of the upward trend in asset values, which correlates with the trend towards weaker monetary
transmission through time. In the absence of this eﬀect, notice how the impact of UM on lending
growth at the representative bank moderates from -0.94 to -0.74. Crucially however, our other
results are very robust in the ﬁnal column in table 7. In particular, the lending contraction at
the representative bank is one-third larger when policy is measured using UM rather than FF.
Moreover, the shielding of lending growth amongst holding companies is 1.5 times larger using
the exogenous policy measure. Finally, it is the equity capital ratio, not the securities ratio,
that serves as a buﬀer to lending growth when monetary policy shocks are measured using UM.
6 Conclusions
The credit market turmoil of 2007 and 2008 has highlighted the critical role played by the bank-
ing system in the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy. Recently, policymakers
have focused on the way in which banking sector conditions have blunted the stabilizing eﬀects
of the large interest rate reductions implemented by the FOMC during the ﬁrst half of 2008
(Rosengren, 2008). During the last decade, considerable progress has been made in identifying
the features of the banking industry that matter for monetary transmission, especially following
the creation of the large database on the activities of FDIC-insured banks in the United States
in work by Kashyap and Stein (2000). The bulk of this research has used the realized federal
funds rate to measure monetary policy. The key point emphasized in our paper is that such a
policy measure is endogenous to expected future macroeconomic conditions, which are likely to
exert separate eﬀects on both loan demand and loan supply. We have set out examples of such
eﬀects and have argued that they may induce bias in both the estimated direct impact of mone-
31tary policy on bank lending and in the estimated impact conditional upon bank characteristics.
In the empirics, we provided a comparison of the heterogeneity in bank lending responses to
an explicitly identiﬁed monetary policy measure and the realized interest rate which is more
commonly used in the literature.
The results indicated both economically and statistically signiﬁcant attenuation of lending
responses to monetary contractions, accompanied by the shielding of lending associated with
bank holding company aﬃliation. We also found sign reversals in the eﬀects conditional upon
some characteristics. Speciﬁcally, the share of securities in total assets was shown to amplify
policy transmission from exogenous interest rate changes, while restricting the transmission of
realized interest rate changes. One explanation for this result is that many types of securities
are subject to an adverse valuation eﬀect following exogenous monetary policy contractions,
which limits the scope for lending at banks that hold them in large numbers. In contrast,
endogenous rises in the federal funds rate may be associated with lending increases (due to the
underlying macroeconomic conditions to which policy is endogenous) at banks which choose to
invest heavily in securities. The bank characteristic found to correlate with shielding of lending
growth after policy contractions was the equity capital ratio. This shielding eﬀect was stronger
using the exogenous policy measure.
An important research implication from our work is that future studies of the banking
system and monetary transmission should consider exogenous policy measures, alongside other
measures such as the realized federal funds rate. In particular, the identiﬁcation of exogenous
monetary policy should take into account the forward-looking drivers of monetary policy such
as growth and inﬂation forecasts, because these forward-looking variables are likely to impact
lending markets. Interesting avenues for future work include the examination of the impact of
exogenous monetary policy upon regional, industrial, and ﬁrm-speciﬁc lending. It would then
be possible to compare these impacts with those from the realized federal funds rate, and to
consider their consistency with the banking sector structure relevant to the associated regions,
industries, and ﬁrms. One possibility is that heterogeneity in the banking sector may account
for a larger proportion of the diﬀerential eﬀects of monetary policy across these units when an
exogenous policy measure is employed (see section 4 discussion). Other interesting areas for
future work include the application of the methodology used here to study heterogeneity in
32lending rates, as opposed to lending quantities. In addition, it would be useful to investigate
the eﬀects of bank characteristics on responses to policy at a more disaggregated level, such as
the relationship to the particular mixture of securities held as bank assets.
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36Table 1: Table 1
Determinants of changes in the intended federal funds rate
regressor Coefficient Standard error
intercept -0.910 1.168
target from last meeting -0.024 0.011
forecasted output growth
-1 0.006 0.010
0 -0.013 0.020
1 -0.025 0.028
2 0.016 0.031
total effect -0.016 0.027
output growth revision
-1 0.005 0.025
0 0.134 0.029
1 -0.022 0.041
2 -0.008 0.050
total effect 0.104 0.068
forecasted inflation
-1 0.030 0.023
0 -0.017 0.028
1 0.020 0.043
2 0.014 0.044
total effect 0.047 0.020
inflation revision
-1 0.007 0.030
0 -0.020 0.041
1 -0.016 0.066
2 -0.050 0.074
total effect -0.079 0.082
forecasted unemployment
-1 -0.137 0.162
0 0.599 0.352
1 -0.290 0.475
2 -0.218 0.319
total effect -0.047 0.035
unemployment revision
-1 -0.189 0.216
0 -0.515 0.319
1 0.684 0.441
2 -0.444 0.343
total effect -0.464 0.204
capacity utilization 0.015 0.012
capacity utilization growth 0.136 0.035
R
2=0.36, N=298. The sample is all scheduled FOMC meetings from the period 
1969-2001. See the main text for a description of the regressors. The total effects 
refer to the sum of the coefficients on sets of forecasts or forecast revisions for the 
previous, current and next two quarters.
37Table 2: Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Bank Level Variables
1977 1988 1999
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev
Loan growth 4.51 5.48 1.81 5.65 2.24 5.47
Assets 84.51 1105.97 209 2257.81 506.58 6761.38
Holding company status 26.29 44.02 68.86 46.31 79.67 40.25
Securities/assets 30.57 12.17 28.86 15.83 27.16 13.72
Equity capital/assets 8.55 2.48 8.78 2.84 10.23 3.51
Internal cash/assets 1.15 1.27 1.52 2.87 0.88 1.13
Residential loan share 33.15 17.25 44.11 17.53 56.3 18.74
Consumer loan share 28.54 14.34 20.54 13.11 14.6 12.09
Commercial loan share 19.41 12.75 21.17 13.45 17.06 11.35
No. of banks 14 026 12 516 8 030
Summary statistics are calculated for all banks included in the baseline estimation sample for at least part of a year,
and therefore reflect across bank and within bank variation. All variables are reported as percentages, except assets
which is measured in millions of current price US$. The holding company status variable measures the fraction of banks
in the sample affiliated with a holding company. See the text for further discussion concerning the measurement of the
variables.
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8Table 3: Table 3
Lending Responses at the Representative Bank
Horizon UM FF
0 -0.04* -0.03**
(0.02) (0.005)
1 -0.40** -0.18**
(0.02) (0.009)
2 -0.75** -0.38**
(0.04) (0.014)
3 -0.92** -0.60**
(0.05) (0.02)
4 -0.94** -0.73**
(0.05) (0.02)
Notes: Cumulative responses to a 100b.p. tightening at
the specified horizon are reported for a bank at the
sample average of continuously measured
characteristics and not part of a holding company.
Standard errors after clustering at the bank level are
reported in parentheses. ** and * indicate significance
at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
39Table 4: Table 4
Bank Lending Responses to Monetary Policy
UM FF
representative bank
marginal effect -0.94** -0.73**
(0.05) (0.02)
assets
interaction 0.26** 0.08**
(0.03) (0.01)
marginal effect -0.68** -0.66**
(0.06) (0.03)
holding company status
interaction 1.88** 1.21**
(0.08) (0.04)
marginal effect 0.95** 0.47**
(0.07) (0.03)
securities ratio
interaction -0.22** 0.04*
(0.04) (0.02)
marginal effect -1.16** -0.69**
(0.06) (0.03)
equity capital ratio
interaction 0.24** 0.04**
(0.04) (0.016)
marginal effect -0.70** -0.69**
(0.06) (0.03)
net cash ratio
interaction 0.97** 0.08
(0.26) (0.14)
marginal effect 0.03 -0.65**
(0.30) (0.13)
Observations 1053334 1052453
R
2 0.16 0.16
Notes: The reported lending responses are the sum of
contemporaneous and four lagged responses to a 100 b.p. policy
tightening. Interaction effects are calculated for a bank one
standard deviation above the sample average for a characteristic
and marginal effects sum the direct and interacted effects.
Standard errors obtained after clustering at the bank level are
reported in parentheses. ** and * indicate significance at the 1%
and 5% levels respectively.
40Table 5: Table 5
Holding Company Status and Lending Responses to Monetary Policy
UM FF
representative bank
marginal effect -0.81** -0.70**
(0.06) (0.02)
holding company status
interaction with policy 1.60** 1.09**
(0.10) (0.04)
assets
interaction with policy 0.48** 0.03
(0.04) (0.02)
interaction with policy -0.65** 0.09**
and holding company (0.07) (0.03)
securities ratio
interaction -0.57** 0.04*
(0.05) (0.02)
interaction with policy 0.76** -0.07
and holding company (0.08) (0.03)
equity capital ratio
interaction 0.21** 0.07**
(0.04) (0.02)
interaction with policy -0.14 -0.09**
and holding company (0.08) (0.03)
net cash ratio
interaction 1.40** 0.14
(0.27) (0.09)
interaction with policy -1.12** -0.19
and holding company (0.40) (0.12)
Observations 1053673 1052665
R
2 0.16 0.16
Notes: The reported lending responses are the sum of contemporaneous and four
lagged responses to a 100 b.p. policy tightening. Interaction effects are calculated
for a bank one standard deviation above the sample average for a characteristic.
Standard errors obtained after clustering at the bank level are reported in
parentheses. ** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
41Table 6: Table 6
Monetary Policy and the Structure of Bank Lending
UM FF
representative bank
marginal effect -0.80** -0.70**
(0.05) (0.02)
residential
interaction 0.13** 0.04*
(0.04) (0.02)
marginal effect -0.66** -0.66**
(0.06) (0.03)
consumer
interaction 0.05 -0.24**
(0.03) (0.02)
marginal effect -0.74** -0.94**
(0.05) (0.03)
commercial
interaction 0.08* -0.003
(0.04) (0.02)
marginal effect -0.71** -0.70**
(0.06) (0.03)
Observations 1050736 1049694
R
2 0.17 0.17
Notes: The reported lending responses are the sum of
contemporaneous and four laggeed responses to a 100 b.p. policy
tightening. Interaction effects are calculated for a bank one
standard deviation above the sample average for a given loan
share and marginal effects sum the direct and interacted effects.
Standard errors obtained after clustering at the bank level are
reported in parentheses. ** and * indicate significance at the 1%
and 5% levels respectively.
42Table 7:
Robustness Tests for the Baseline Model
ROBUSTNESS BASEL & LTCM FIXED PRE-DETERMINED SCALE TOTAL
TEST EPISODES EFFECTS CHARACTERISTICS ASSETS
UM FF UM FF UM FF UM FF
representative bank
marginal effect -0.96** -0.77** -0.86** -0.75** -0.88** -0.69** -0.74** -0.55**
(0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02)
assets
interaction 0.29** -0.01 0.24** 0.04** 0.43** 0.09** -0.05* -0.09**
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
holding company status
interaction 1.56** 0.96** 1.53** 1.24** 1.69** 1.08** 1.79** 1.19**
(0.10) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03)
securities ratio
interaction -0.36** 0.06** -0.15** 0.1** -0.01 0.06** -0.23** 0.04*
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
equity capital ratio
interaction 0.09* 0.01 0.28** 0.04** 0.12** 0.01 0.08* 0.002
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01)
net cash ratio
interaction 1.60** 0.08 0.98** 0.01 -0.74** -0.05* 1.31** 0.03
(0.22) (0.09) (0.25) (0.10) (0.14) (0.02) (0.29) (0.18)
Observations 1054328 1053721 1053334 1052453 1032780 1031899 1053403 1052489
R
2 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Notes: The reported lending responses are the sum of contemporaneous and four laggeed responses to a 100 b.p. policy tightening. Interaction
effects are calculated for a bank one standard deviation above the sample average for a given characteristic. Marginal effects sum the direct and
interacted effects. Standard errors obtained after clustering at the bank level are reported in parentheses. ** and * indicate significance at the
1% and 5% levels respectively.
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3Figure 1: Time Series Plots for UM and FF
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Notes: Variables are defined as in the main text. The correlation of UM and FF over the sample in the figure is 0.60. The 
sample variance of UM is 0.76 percentage points (76 basis points) and the sample variance of FF is 1.57 percentage points (157 
basis points). 
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